We assume c. 20% of the on-trade in the UK will not re-open post lockdown. This compares with the Heineken CEO’s estimate that 10-15% of the on-trade across the European region will close permanently. Given the UK is one of the hardest hit economies in the region, we expect its on-trade to be more severely affected. In time, new formats and locations may open, but this will probably happen over several years. Hopefully C&C will be able to take a greater share of this new smaller pie, but there is likely to be a period of profit shortfall. It is difficult to assess the degree to which restructuring will have been able to relieve the effect of the lockdowns on C&C’s business. Management flagged a restructuring would occur at the interim results in late October, at which point it estimated the business was losing €10m in cash (and €6m+ of EBIT) during every month of full lockdown. We assume C&C is able to cut 20% of the workforce (and, by extension, employee costs). We assume (generously) that nearly all other costs besides D&A and employee costs are variable and can fall in-line with sales. We update our model for the c.4 additional months of lockdown in FY21E and the c.3 additional months of lockdown in FY22E, and incorporate our assumed restructuring benefits. This results in our downgrade. Net debt was €372m at the H1 stage (up from €327m at the FY20 year-end). About €55m of excise payments due to the UK government in H1 would have been paid in H2, and there is the ongoing drain on cash from the lockdowns (which restructuring and tight WCR management will not fully offset, we think). Hence we expect net debt will rise to c. €430m at the end of FY21E. The relative valuation to other Europe-listed Brewers, normalised to +24m (STM) profits to account for the different year ends and a ‘normal’ year of earnings, shows the typical 15-25% valuation gap has narrowed.